ABSTRACT The integration of 5G networks and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is critical in the new era of the Internet of Things (IoT), for a wide range of applications. However, despite the potential advantages of this integration, there are concerns about unforeseen security threats that may impact our daily lives. Authenticated key agreement is an essential security feature for secure communication between users and IoT devices, and for protecting IoT applications from security threats. An IoT notion-based authentication and key agreement scheme was recently proposed for heterogeneous WSNs, claiming to provide user anonymity and mutual authentication, as well as the ability to withstand several types of attacks. In this paper, we examine several security weaknesses of the aforementioned scheme. Next, we design a network architecture suitable for the integration of 5G networks and WSNs. Based on the network architecture, we propose a two-factor authentication and key agreement scheme in 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT that can resist various attacks, including those identified earlier, and that can preserve security requirements, including unlinkability. Finally, we evaluate the security and performance of the proposed scheme and compare our scheme with other related schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology that connects a variety of devices, including smartphones, home appliances, sensors, and other network devices. This new technology can be applied in many application domains, such as smart homes (e.g., security, heating and lighting control), smart cities, healthcare (e.g., remote patient monitoring), and smart manufacturing (e.g., remote monitoring and control of manufacturing system). For the development of IoT applications, establishing an open, standardized network stack with protocols catering to the needs of the constrained devices is essential [1] . Moreover, because the IoT spans such a wide range of application domains, its deployment requires heterogeneous network connectivity [2] .
Smartphones have played an important role in early IoT services, communicating using Wi-Fi and cellular network technologies. Cellular networks are considered a potential candidate for providing connectivity to IoT devices, owing to their mobility support, reliability, and ubiquitous deployment [3] . In particular, the fifth-generation networks (5G) currently under development are aiming to provide high speed (1 Gbps), low power, and low latency (1 ms or less). Hence 5G technology will accelerate the deployment of many IoT applications, demanding more ubiquity, more mobility, better performance and speed, and faster response times.
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a large number of wireless, resource-constrained, small sensor nodes, deployed in an area of interest to monitor and collect physical or environmental conditions, such as light, temperature, pressure, motion, sound, or pollutants. WSNs play an important role in the IoT by supporting the sensing and collecting of environmental information. Thus, to successfully provide IoT applications, the integration of 5G networks and WSNs is required.
However, despite of the potential of this integration, it also exposes us further to security threats in our daily lives.
Hence, security and privacy are critical to protecting IoT applications from such attacks. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the networks can have a significant influence on the security of IoT applications [4] , where resource-constrained sensor nodes must open a secure communication with more powerful devices. For example, in a smart home, home sensor nodes communicate with the user's smartphone. For secure communications between any parties, and to provide equivalent security levels for communications between diverse devices, optimal cryptography algorithms are essential. Furthermore, IoT devices require high-speed and efficient lightweight security.
In IoT, only legitimate users should be able to access authentic IoT devices (i.e., a gateway or sensor node) and a session key should be established between the user and the IoT device for secure data transmission. Therefore, mutual authentication with key agreement is an important requirement for the IoT. Because the IoT carries data that may contain personal privacy information (i.e., identity and position) and anyone can access another user's device, any information leaks may compromise users' privacy. In 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT, anonymity is an important security aspect, because it protects the privacy of both users and the IoT devices such as sensor nodes. Anonymity typically refers to the state in which an individual's personal identity or personally identifiable information is not known publicly. The unlinkability of two or more items of interest, from an attacker's perspective, means that within the system, the attacker cannot identify whether these items are related. Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [5] point out that unlinkability is a sufficient condition of anonymity, but not a necessary condition. However, to remain completely anonymous, most users want strong anonymity [6] , which requires unlinkability, where an attacker's examination of the pseudonym holder's message provides no new information about the holder's true name [7] . Thus, in order to properly protect user privacy, both anonymity and unlinkability should be considered.
A. RELATED WORK
In 2006, Wong et al. [8] proposed a lightweight user authentication scheme for WSNs based on XOR and hash operations. However, in 2009, Das [9] showed that the scheme could not withstand a stolen verifier attack and an attack where many users were logged-in with the same ID and, thus, proposed a two-factor-based user authentication scheme to resolve these issues. In his scheme, a password and a smart card are used as two factors to authenticate a user. However, in 2010, a number of researchers [10] - [13] pointed out security problems in Das's scheme, and proposed improvements to overcome. Then, Das et al. [14] in 2012 and Xue et al. [15] in 2013 individually presented user authentication and key agreement schemes for WSNs based on the use of smart cards.
Recently, in 2014, Turkanović et al. [16] proposed a user authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous ad-hoc WSNs, based on the IoT. Their scheme is lightweight because it uses only simple operations, such as XOR and hash function. Through IoT, a random user can connect directly to a single sensor node from the WSN, and negotiate a session key with it without connecting to a gateway node. Unfortunately, the scheme was later proved to be vulnerable to multiple attacks, by Chang and Le [17] , Farash et al. [18] , Amin and Biswas [19] , and Tai et al. [20] .
In 2016, Chang and Le [17] pointed out that Turkanović et al.'s scheme is susceptible to an impersonation attack with node capture, a stolen smart card attack, a sensor node spoofing attack, and a stolen verifier attack, as well as failing to ensure backward secrecy. Chang et al. proposed a flexible authentication protocol using a smart card for WSNs that operates in two modes: a lightweight authentication scheme, as an improvement to that of Turkanović et al. scheme, and an advanced protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), providing perfect forward secrecy.
At the same time, Farash et al. [18] identified that Turkanović et al.'s scheme cannot resist a stolen smart card attack and a man-in-the-middle attack, and that it does not provide untraceability and forward/backward secrecy. Based on their analysis, they proposed an improved user authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous WSNs. However, Amin et al. found that Farash et al.'s scheme does not withstand a known session-specific temporary information attack, an offline password guessing attack using a stolen smart card attack, a new smart card issue attack, and a user impersonation attack. Furthermore, it does not preserve user anonymity and the secrecy of the secret key of the gateway node [21] . Amin et al. then presented an anonymouspreserving three-factor authenticated key exchange protocol for WSNs, in which a password, a smart card, and biometrics are used as three factors.
In 2016, Amin and Biswas [19] proved that Turkanović et al.'s scheme does not prevent an offline identity-password guessing attack, a smart card theft attack, a user impersonation attack, and a sensor node impersonation attack, as well as providing an inefficient authentication phase. As a solution, they proposed a secure lightweight scheme for user authentication and key agreement in multigateway based WSNs.
Most recently, in 2017, Tai et al. also showed that Turkanović et al.'s scheme does not ensure user anonymity, and that a session key established in the scheme can be leaked using compromised sensor nodes. To overcome these security flaws, they proposed an improvement to Turkanović et al.'s scheme. They claimed that their scheme ensures user anonymity and mutual authentication between all parties. However, we have found that Tai et al.'s scheme does not provide mutual authentication and sensor node anonymity and, furthermore that it is susceptible to a sensor node spoofing attack with sensor node capturing, a privileged-insider attack, and a session-specific temporary information attack [22] . We also find additional security weaknesses in the scheme, namely, being susceptible to stolen smart card and offline password guessing attacks and no securing user anonymity.
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B. CONTRIBUTION
As shown in the section on related works, the existing studies on user authentication and key agreement for WSNs fail to satisfy desirable security features. In particular, most of the proposed schemes do not provide strong anonymity, referred to as unlinkability. In addition, they focus mainly on WSNs, which means their network architectures are not suitable for 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT.
• We analyze the security of Tai et al.'s most recent user authentication and key agreement scheme for IoT-based ad hoc heterogeneous WSNs. We show that their scheme is vulnerable to several attacks including stolen smart card, offline password guessing, sensor node spoofing, privileged-insider, and session-specific temporary information attacks. We also show that Tai et al.'s scheme does not preserve user and sensor node anonymity, mutual authentication, and the secrecy of the secret key of the gateway node.
• We design a network architecture suitable for 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT. Under the new network architecture, we propose a secure two-factor authentication and key agreement scheme that overcomes the aforementioned security weaknesses and preserves all the security features of Tai et al.'s scheme. Moreover, our proposed scheme withstands all known attacks and ensures unlinkability and, thus, strong anonymity.
• Using a security evaluation, we show that our proposed scheme can resist many attacks, including those that would compromise Tai et al.'s scheme. In addition, we compare the security features of our proposed scheme with those of other related schemes.
• Through a performance evaluation, we compare the performance of our proposed scheme with other related schemes in terms of their computational cost, communication cost, and storage cost.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
Section 2 briefly reviews Tai et al.'s scheme, after which we discuss its security weaknesses in Section 3. Section 4 addresses the proposed authentication and key agreement scheme with unlinkability, based on the new network design. The security evaluation of the proposed scheme is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the performance comparison with other related schemes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
II. REVIEW OF TAI et al.'s SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Tai et al.'s scheme [20] , which consists of six phases: pre-deployment, registration, login, authentication, password-change, and dynamic node addition. The registration phase is divided further into two sub-phases: user registration and sensor node registration. The notation used in Tai et al.'s scheme is given in Table 1 .
A. PRE-DEPLOYMENT PHASE
A network administrator predefines a pair of an identifier SID j and a password X GWN −j for each sensor node S j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ m and m is the number of sensor nodes in the WSN. X GWN −j is generated randomly and stored in S j 's memory. For GWN , the administrator predefines two secure password keys X GWM and X U , known only to GWN and stored in GWN 's memory. In addition, GWN stores SID j and X GWN −j for each sensor node S j .
B. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
On demand, a user U i initiates the user registration phase, after which he/she can access any sensor node.
(1) U i selects her/his identity ID i and password PW i and sends a registration request ID i , PW i to GWN through a secure channel. (2) GWN randomly selects a password key X GWN −i for U i and stores it with ID i in its memory. It then computes
, and
into the SC's memory. Then, GWN sends it to U i through a secure channel.
C. SENSOR NODE REGISTRATION PHASE
The sensor node registration phase is conducted after the deployment of sensor nodes in the target field.
(1) S j computes MP j = h(SID j ||T 1 ||X GWN −j ), where T 1 is the S j 's current timestamp, and sends the registration request SID j , MP j , T 1 to GWN . (2) Upon receiving the registration request, GWN checks 
= z j . If this fails, S j asks GWN to resend e j , z j . If S j still cannot verify the resent e j , z j successfully, this phase is reexecuted immediately. If z * j = z j , S j confirms that f * j = f j , and stores f * j in its memory.
D. LOGIN PHASE
In order to access information from the WSN, U i needs to log in.
(1) U i inserts her/his SC into the card reader and inputs ID i and 
E. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In this phase, U i and S j can authenticate each other and negotiate a session key to be shared between them, with the help of GWN .
(1) Upon receiving the authentication request from U i , S j checks |T 1 − T C | < T . If this fails, S j terminates this phase and sends a rejection message to U i . Otherwise, S j selects a random number K j , and computes
where T 2 is the current timestamp of S j . S j then sends
If this fails, GWN terminates this phase and sends a rejection message to S j . Otherwise, GWN searches the corresponding X GWN −j using the received SID j , and computes
= B j . If this fails, GWN aborts all further actions and sends a rejection message to S j . Otherwise, GWN successfully authenticates S j .
= N i . If this fails, GWN aborts all further actions and sends a rejection message indicating that U i is illegal to S j . Otherwise, GWN confirms that U i and S j are legal.
If this fails, all further actions are aborted and S j sends a rejection message to GWN and U i . Otherwise, S j computes
= F ij . If this fails, S j asks GNW to resend the message. If S j still cannot verify the resent message successfully, all further actions are aborted and S j sends a rejection message to GWN and 4 . If the resent message is still not verified successfully, U i terminates this phase and sends a rejection message to S j . Otherwise, if R * ij = R ij , U i confirms that GWN and S j are legal, and that the computed SK * is equal to S j 's SK .
III. SECURITY WEAKNESSES OF TAI et al.'s SCHEME
In this section, we discuss the security weaknesses of Tai et al.'s scheme, and show that an adversary can mount different types of attacks on the scheme.
A. INSECURITY OF THE SECRET KEY OF THE GATEWAY NODE
In Tai et al.'s scheme, an authorized user U i can extract the hashed value of secret key X U , because it is easy for U i to compute X U = e i ⊕ h(PW i ) using its own password PW i and the retrieved information e i from his/her smart card SC i . Thus, the secret key X U of the gateway node, which is used for every user, is not secure.
B. STOLEN SMART CARD AND OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS
Although a smart card is usually equipped with tamper resistant hardware, by launching power analysis attacks [23] , an adversary can extract all sensitive information stored in its memory. Thus, we assume that if a user's smart card is stolen or lost, an adversary can obtain the information (i.e., f i ,
In Section III-A, we described how an authorized user U j , who wants to act as an adversary, can know X U . After extracting X U from his/her own smart card, and using the smart card stolen from the legal user U i , adversary U j can guess PW * i and compute e * i = h(PW * i )⊕X U . If e * i = e i holds, then the adversary can obtain the actual password. Thus, Tai et al.'s scheme is susceptible to stolen smart card and offline password guessing attacks.
C. INSECURITY OF USER ANONYMITY
As in the case of an offline password guessing attack, if an authorized user U j , who acts as an adversary, knows X U , the adversary can compute another legitimate user's identity. The adversary U j intercepts a legitimate user U i 's login message MI i , Z i , N i , T 1 during protocol execution, where
, which is the original identity of U i . Therefore, the user-anonymity property can be broken easily.
D. NO SENSOR NODE ANONYMITY
In the authentication phase, the sensor node S j sends the request message MI i , Z i , N i , T 1 , SID j , A j , B j , T 2 to the gateway node GWN via an insecure channel. Clearly, if an adversary intercepts this request message from the insecure channel, he/she can obtain S j 's identity SID j . Thus, the anonymity of sensor nodes is not preserved in Tai et al.'s scheme.
E. LACK OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In a user authentication and key agreement scheme, mutual authentication of all involved parties is essential. Tai et al. stated that their scheme provides mutual authentication between any two of a gateway node, a sensor node, and a user. However, in their scheme, it is not possible for a user to authenticate a sensor node.
In Tai et al.'s scheme, U i should authenticate the chosen sensor node S j with the help of GWN . However, in the last step of the authentication phase, S j delivers only one value R i received from GWN to U i , and R i does not include any information to authenticate S j . Here, U i only utilizes this value to extract K * j in order to compute SK , which will be shared with S j in this session. Furthermore, U i verifies only the session key through R * ij ? = R ij , and does not verify the source authentication of the message
In other words, U i does not check whether the message is truly from the selected S j with SID j herself/himself during the login phase. Thus, an adversary can launch the sensor node spoofing attack described in the next section, because of the lack of mutual authentication.
F. SENSOR NODE SPOOFING ATTACK WITH SENSOR NODE CAPTURING
An adversary can capture or compromise a sensor node and extract important information stored in its memory because WSNs are installed in unattended or hostile environments. In Tai et al.'s scheme, if an adversary compromises one sensor node, he/she can masquerade any non-compromised and legitimate sensor node to which a user is trying to log in.
Suppose that an adversary compromises a sensor node S j and obtains SID j , X GWN −j , and f j from the compromised S j . When a user U i wants to log into the sensor node S k , the adversary performs the following steps to launch a sensor node spoofing attack:
(1) When U i sends MI i , Z i , N i , T 1 to S k , the adversary intercepts that message and randomly selects K j . Then, the adversary computes
using S j 's compromised parameters X GWN −j and f j and the current timestamp T 2 . The adversary sends
2) Upon receiving the above message from S j , GWN performs the verification process as per step (2) in the authentication phase. Because M i , Z i , and N i are not bound to S k , GWN cannot identify whether these were actually sent to S k , and not to S j . In addition, the adversary used valid parameters of S j to compute A j and B j and, thus, GWN trusts that the received message is valid and that is originated from the sensor node S j , chosen by U i . GWN then computes R i , R j , and F ij and sends R i , R j , F ij , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 to the adversary, who is now impersonating the sensor node S j . (3) On receiving R i , R j , F ij , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 from GWN , the adversary obtains K * i using the compromised parameters f j and X GWN −j , and computes 
H. SESSION-SPECIFIC TEMPORARY INFORMATION ATTACK
Canetti and Krawczyk [24] introduced a session-specific temporary information attack. This attack implies that if the specific information generated temporarily for a session is leaked, the session key established in the that session is no longer secure.
In Tai et al's scheme, U i and S j compute the session key based on the temporary random numbers K i and K j generated by U i and S j , respectively. If these two temporary numbers K i and K j are leaked, then an adversary can compute the session key SK = h(K i ⊕ K j ) established between U i and S j . Thus, the security of the session key is compromised in the event of a leakage of session-specific temporary information.
IV. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose a two-factor authentication and key agreement scheme in 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT, that overcomes the aforementioned security weaknesses identified in Tai et al.'s scheme.
As mentioned in Section I-B, we design a network architecture suitable for user authentication and key agreement in 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT. Figure 1 describes the network architecture. The proposed model consists of three types of entities: the user (U i ), IoT gateway (GW j ), and an IoT application server (IAS). After registration and mutual authentication, for IoT services, U i can obtain real-time data from GW j via a 5G network. The main tasks of GW j are to collect real-time data from sensor nodes in the WSN, and to deliver them to the authenticated user via the 5G network. Thus, as an IoT gateway, GW j can be located in eNodeB or a small cell in the 5G access network. Here, IAS is responsible for providing a registration facility for U i , as well as proper IoT services, based on the underlying WSNs, to the authenticated user via the 5G network. Thus, IAS can be located in the 5G core network.
Our proposed scheme consists of four phases: system setup, user registration, login and authentication, and password change. We use the additional notation for the proposed scheme listed in Table 2 . 
A. SYSTEM SETUP PHASE
Before the deployment of gateways and sensor nodes in a target field, this phase is executed by the IoT application server (IAS) in offline mode. This phase is described below.
(1) IAS selects a master secret X U for users, which is known only to IAS.
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(2) IAS chooses an identity GWID j and randomly selects the first one-time pseudonym PGW 1 j for every gateway GW j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ m and m is the number of gateways. (3) IAS selects a master secret X GW for gateways, which is known only to IAS, and computes v j = h(GWID j ||X GW ) and w 1 j = h(PGW 1 j ), which are different for each gateway.
in the memory of GW j in a secure manner.
B. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
When a new user U i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n is the number of users, wants to obtain an IoT application service based on WSNs, U i must first register with the IAS. This phase is described in Figure 2 and below.
( 
C. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE
The login and authentication phase is executed through a public channel whenever U i wants to gain access to a WSN using his/her ID i , PW i , and SC i . Figure 3 illustrates the login and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. To achieve mutual authentication and session key agreement, this phase executes in several steps as follows.
, where T 1 is the current timestamp of U i , and GWID j is the identity of the gateway GW j where the user is currently located. SC i sends a login message 
, and minates the scheme because GW j is not proved to be legitimate. Furthermore, IAS sends a rejection message to U i and GW j . (5) 
, and checks the correctness of the received M 4 . If the latter is not valid, IAS aborts the session and sends a rejection message to U i and GW j . Otherwise, IAS continues to the next step.
, which are used to compute the session key between U i and GW j . IAS then computes 
, and 
, and 15 . If this fails, U i terminates the session and sends a rejection message to GW j . If it matches, U i believes the authenticity of GW j and updates e i , g i of the memory of its own smart card SC i using PU 2 i , z 2 * i , respectively. Finally, U i successfully ends the login and authentication phase, and both U i and GW j can communicate securely using the derived session key SK U i GW j .
D. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
In the proposed scheme, a user can freely change his/her password without the help of an IoT application server. This phase contains the following steps.
(1) U i inserts his/her smart card SC i into a terminal, and inputs identity ID i and his/her old password 
), respectively, in its memory.
V. SECURITY EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Here, we present a security evaluation of our proposed scheme by showing how it satisfies the security requirements and is secure against various known attacks. We also compare the security of the proposed scheme with other related schemes, in Table 3 .
A. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
On receiving the authentication message, including the login message of U i from GW j , IAS uses the pseudonyms PU 1 i and PGW 1 j to search for identities MID i and GWID j , respectively, in the database. This is because an adversary cannot generate legal z 1 * i = h(PU 1 i ||X U ) and w 1 * j = h(PGW 1 j ||X GW ) without knowing IAS's secret X U and X GW , even if he/she knows PU 1 i and PGW 1 j . IAS also retrieves MID * i and GWID * j from the received messages M 1 and M 5 by computing z 1 * i and w 1 * j , and verifies the legitimacy of U i and GW j using MID * i = MID i and GWID * j = GWID j , respectively. On the other hand, on receiving the authentication reply from IAS, using PU 1 i in the login message of U i , GW j retrieves NK * i from the message and computes NK j and
to verify the legitimacy of IAS and U i using M * 14 = M 14 . This is because only a legitimate IAS can retrieve the correct value v j = h(GWID j ||X GW ) of GW j and can compute M 12 using both v j and the same pseudonym PU 1 i of U i , who requested the login, and provide these values to GW j .
On receiving the login reply from GW j , using GWID j of the gateway requested access in the login message M 4 i ||X U ) of U i , compute M 11 using y i , z 1 i , and the same identity GWID j of GW i which the user wants to access, and provide these values to U i . Therefore, our proposed scheme provides mutual authentication.
B. SECURE SESSION KEY AGREEMENT AND RESILIENCE TO A SESSION-SPECIFIC TEMPORARY INFORMATION ATTACK
Secure session key agreement is essential to providing confidentiality of future communication between a user and a gateway. In the proposed scheme, at the end of the authentication phase, U i and GW j agree on the session key i ||v * j ||T 3 ) without knowing y i and z i , respectively. As a result, our proposed scheme achieves secure key agreement, and a leakage of the session-specific temporary information K i and K j does not affect the security of the established session key.
C. ANONYMITY WITH UNLINKABILITY
From the registration phase, user U i always uses the masked identity MID i = h(a i ||ID i ) instead of the real identity ID i . In the login authentication phase, U i and GW j hide MID i and GWID j by computing masked versions M 1 = h(z 1 * i ||T 1 ) ⊕ MID i and M 5 = h(w j ||T 2 )⊕GWID j , respectively. Because all messages in the login and authentication phase are transmitted via a public channel, an adversary could simply eavesdrop on the channel. If an adversary eavesdrops on the communication between all parties in the login and authentication phase, he/she cannot detect the identities MID i and GW j from the intercepted messages.
To enable IAS to identify each U i and GW j , the proposed scheme utilizes the one-time pseudonyms PU k i and PGW k j , which are different for each login and authentication session. During the k-th login and authentication, these pseudonyms PU k i and PGW k j are updated individually for the k + 1-th login and authentication using random numbers r k i and s k j selected by U i and GW j , respectively. IAS is also able to update the pseudonyms using r * k i and s * k j , retrieved from the received message. Then, U i and GW j can verify that the updated pseudonyms of IAS are properly synchronized using M * 11 = M 11 and M * 14 = M 14 , respectively. Moreover, all other messages are also different for each login and authentication session due to the use of current timestamps. Thus, an adversary cannot identify users between different login and authentication sessions by capturing all messages of those sessions. In addition to, an adversary cannot determine which gateway is involved in different login and authentication sessions. In conclusion, our proposed scheme achieves user and gateway anonymity with unlinkability.
D. RESILIENCE TO STOLEN SMART CARD, OFFLINE IDENTITY GUESSING, AND OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS
During the execution of the proposed scheme, a user's identity ID i and password PW i are protected by a random value a i and the non-invertible cryptographic one-way hash function. Thus, an adversary cannot extract the user's identity and password. However, the adversary may attempt to extract the stored information of U i and guess ID i and PW i , based on the extracted information.
Suppose that an adversary steals the smart card of a legal user U i . By launching power analysis attacks [23] , the adversary can then extract the stored information {x i , d i , e i , g i , b i } in the smart card SC i of the user U i , where
Because both ID i and PW i in x i are well protected by the non-invertible cryptographic one-way hash function, these are unknown to the adversary. If the adversary tries to guess either an identity or password, he/she has to guess two parameters at the same time, which is infeasible in polynomial time. Furthermore, except of b i , all other values are computed using the masked identity MID i and password MPW i with a random value a i , instead of ID i and PW . Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against stolen smart card, offline identity guessing, and offline password guessing attacks.
E. RESILIENCE TO A PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
A strong password policy and a multi-factor authentication system can make it difficult for a user to remember passwords on multiple accounts [25] . Thus, it is common practice for users to reuse passwords on multiple accounts [26] , [27] . In such situations, a privileged-insider, such as the system administrator or IoT application server in the proposed scheme, can misuse or disclose the user's passwords, resulting in a user impersonation on other application systems. A priviledged-insider attack can occur when a user sends her/his password to the system administrator in plaintext form [28] .
During the registration phase of the proposed scheme, U i submits the masked password MPW i instead of the plaintext password PW i to IAS via a secure channel, where MPW i = h(a i ||PW i ). The privileged-insider IAS of our scheme cannot extract the original password PW i from MPW i owing to the non-invertible cryptographic one-way hash function. Hence, the insider cannot use the user's password to access other systems. Therefore, the proposed scheme can withstand a privileged-insider attack.
F. RESILIENCE TO A STOLEN VERIFIER ATTACK
In general, the system administrator or IoT application server stores some information related to users for use during the authentication phase. This information may be stolen by an adversary to launch attacks, including a user impersonation attack. In our scheme, IAS does not maintain any user-specific information (i.e., ID i and PW i ), other than the masked identity MID i and one-time pseudonym PU k i . Thus, the proposed scheme is safe against a stolen verifier attack.
G. RESILIENCE TO AN IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Suppose an adversary obtains a legitimate user U i 's smart card SC i , extracts the stored data {x i , d i , e i , g i , b i }, and intercepts all messages from the previous authentication session. In order to impersonate the user, the adversary should produce a legal login message 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme and compare it with other related schemes in terms of various features, such as the computational cost, communication cost, and storage cost. 
A. COMPUTATIONAL COST ANALYSIS
Our proposed scheme only uses a hash function and XOR operation, which are lightweight compared with other operations, such as symmetric-key encryption/decryption and public-key cryptographic functions. We assume that the running time of symmetric-key encryption/decryption is T e/d ≈ 0.1303 ms and the running time of the hash function is T h ≈ 0.0004 ms, based on the experimental results of [29] .
In Table 4 , we summarize the computational cost (computation complexity) and running time of the proposed scheme and of existing schemes in [14] - [18] and [20] for the user, gateway node (IoT application server in the proposed scheme), and sensor node (gateway in the proposed scheme). With the exception of Das et al.'s scheme, our proposed scheme has a higher computational cost and running time than those of the other schemes. With only 0.084 ms to 0.174 ms added to the running time, our scheme provides all the security features, including unlinkability, and is resilient to various known attacks, as shown in Table 3 . In addition to, all entities in our proposed scheme are more powerful devices than the sensor nodes in other schemes, because the proposed scheme has a different network model to the other schemes.
B. COMMUNICATION COST ANALYSIS
The communication costs of U i , GW j , and IAS of our scheme and other schemes in [14] - [18] and [20] are given in Table 5 . We assume that the lengths of the identity, password, random number, and output of the hash function are each 128 bits (16 bytes) . In the propose scheme, U i transmits 96 bytes, GW j transmits 320 bytes, and IAS transmits 144 bytes. Therefore, the total transmission costs of U i , GW j , and IAS are 520 bytes. The communication costs of U i and IAS do not differ greatly from the communication costs in other related schemes, whereas the communication cost of GW j is relatively high compared to the communication cost of the sensor node in other schemes. However, 320 bytes is not a large value for GW j because the gateways in the proposed scheme have sufficient resources, unlike sensor nodes.
C. STORAGE COST ANALYSIS
Here, we analyze the storage cost in terms of memory capacity of SC and the sensor node or gateway node in our scheme. In other words, we calculate the total length of the parameters, including the hash function h(·), in bits, that a smart card and a sensor or gateway node need to store in their memory. For convenience, we assume that all parameters and the hash function are 128 bits in length.
In Table 6 , we present a smart card storage cost comparison of the proposed scheme and other related existing schemes in [14] - [18] and [20] . In Das et al.'s scheme [14] , a smart card saves the identities and keys for all cluster heads, where CH* denotes the number of cluster heads. The storage cost of the proposed scheme for the smart card and the sensor node is almost equal to that of other schemes, while providing more security features and being resilient to more attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed Tai et al.'s scheme and demonstrated that it is vulnerable to a stolen smart card attack, offline password guessing attack, sensor node spoofing attack, privileged-insider attack, and session-specific temporary information attack. We further showed that Tai et al.'s scheme does not preserve user and sensor node anonymity, mutual authentication, and the secrecy of the secret key of the gateway node. We have designed a network architecture suitable for 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT. Based on this network architecture, we have proposed a secure two-factor authentication and key agreement scheme with unlinkability. We evaluated the security of the proposed scheme and compared it with other related schemes. The results show that the proposed scheme is secure against various known attacks, and that it satisfies all security features, including unlinkability, required for secure user authentication and key agreement. We also evaluated the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of its computational cost, communication cost, and storage cost, which we then compared with those of other related schemes. The evaluation results of security and performance show that our scheme provides better safety without significantly different performance from other schemes, and performance results are expected to improve because the gateway performs better than the sensor node in 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT.
In the future work, we will measure the performance of the proposed scheme by implementing and conducting experiments using actual devices on 5G-integrated WSNs for the IoT (e.g., smart phones and sensor motes) and, will improve the proposed scheme based on the experimental results.
